# TEST 1-5

Here’s your **TEST 1 – BIS-2.2.1** rewritten in a **professional, structured, and audit-ready format** consistent with your previous test cases:

***

#### **TEST 1**

**Test Case ID:** BIS-2.2.1\
**Test Name:** TC\_TEST\_FIRMWARE\_DATA-INTRANSIT\_SECURITY\_ENCRYPTION

***

**Objective**

To verify that the DUT supports and uses **strong encryption algorithms** and the **latest secure TLS versions** (e.g., TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3) to establish secure communication for protecting data in transit.

***

**Tools Used**

* testssl.sh tool
* OpenSSL command-line utility
* DUT specifications and OEM-provided documentation
* Wireshark (optional, for validation of cipher negotiation)

***

**Test Execution Steps**

1. **Documentation Review**
   * Review the OEM-provided technical documentation to identify supported encryption algorithms and TLS versions.
2. **Protocol Scan using testssl.sh**
   * Run `testssl.sh` against the DUT IP and relevant ports (e.g., HTTPS, FTPS, TLS-enabled interfaces).
   *   Example command:

       ```
       ./testssl.sh <DUT_IP>:443
       ```
3. **Analysis of Output**
   * Examine the report to identify:
     * TLS version(s) supported
     * Cipher suites negotiated
     * Key exchange mechanisms
     * Forward secrecy support
     * Warnings about weak/deprecated ciphers

***

**Expected Results for Pass**

* TLS version 1.2 and/or 1.3 is supported and negotiated.
* Only strong, secure cipher suites are used (e.g., AES-GCM, CHACHA20).
* No insecure or deprecated protocols (e.g., SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1) or weak ciphers (e.g., RC4, 3DES) are offered or accepted.

***

**Test Observations**

_(Insert findings here — e.g., "TLS 1.2 and 1.3 supported; cipher negotiation confirmed to use AES-256-GCM with ECDHE; no insecure ciphers detected.")_

***

**Evidence Provided**

* Screenshot or log file from `testssl.sh` output
* Copy of DUT’s TLS configuration documentation
* Wireshark trace (optional) showing handshake and cipher agreement

***

**Test Case Result**

☐ **Pass** – DUT supports secure TLS versions and uses only strong ciphers\
☐ **Fail** – Deprecated TLS versions or weak encryption detected

***

Here’s your **TEST 2 – BIS-2.2.2** rewritten in a **structured, professional, and audit-ready format** aligned with the rest of your documentation:

***

#### **TEST 2**

**Test Case ID:** BIS-2.2.2\
**Test Name:** TC\_TEST\_FIRMWARE\_DATA-IN-TRANSIT\_SECURITY\_SERVER

***

**Objective**

To verify that the DUT **validates the TLS server certificate** correctly during the handshake process, ensuring only trusted certificates are accepted and **invalid or tampered certificates** are rejected, thereby preventing MITM (Man-in-the-Middle) attacks.

***

**Tools Used**

* Custom test server with ability to present valid/invalid certificates (e.g., OpenSSL, Nginx)
* Wireshark or tcpdump (for packet capture during TLS handshake)
* Valid and invalid server certificate sets (self-signed, expired, mismatched CN/SAN, revoked, etc.)

***

**Test Execution Steps**

1. **Prepare Test Server Certificates**
   * Generate the following certificates for testing:
     * A **valid certificate** signed by a trusted CA
     * An **invalid certificate** (e.g., expired, self-signed, altered CN/SAN)
2. **Attempt Connection with Valid Certificate**
   * Establish a TLS session from the DUT to the test server with a valid certificate.
   * Monitor whether the handshake completes successfully.
3. **Attempt Connection with Invalid Certificate**
   * Present an invalid certificate from the test server and attempt a connection from the DUT.
   * Observe whether the DUT **rejects** the handshake.
4. **Packet Capture and Verification**
   * Use Wireshark to capture and analyze TLS handshake packets for both valid and invalid connection attempts.

***

**Expected Results for Pass**

* The DUT **accepts** connections only from servers with **valid and trusted certificates**.
* The DUT **rejects** connections when invalid, tampered, expired, or self-signed certificates are presented.
* Certificate validation includes proper checks for **valid signature, expiry date, issuer, and domain match**.

***

**Test Observations**

_(Insert findings here — e.g., "TLS handshake completed successfully with valid CA-signed certificate; connection rejected when using expired and self-signed certificates.")_

***

**Evidence Provided**

* TLS handshake logs or output
* Wireshark packet captures showing ClientHello/ServerHello exchange and failure on invalid cert
* Screenshots from DUT console or logs confirming certificate validation behavior

***

**Test Case Result**

☐ **Pass** – DUT accepts only valid TLS certificates and rejects invalid ones\
☐ **Fail** – DUT fails to validate certificates correctly

***

Here’s your **TEST 3 – BIS-2.2.3** rewritten in a formal, structured, and audit-compliant format:

***

#### **TEST 3**

**Test Case ID:** BIS-2.2.3\
**Test Name:** TC\_TEST\_FIRMWARE\_DATA-IN-TRANSIT\_SECURITY\_VULNE

***

**Objective**

To assess the DUT's TLS implementation for known vulnerabilities such as **padding oracle attacks**, use of **weak cipher suites**, and **protocol-level weaknesses**, thereby ensuring robustness against TLS-layer exploitation.

***

**Tools Used**

* `testssl.sh`
* `SSLyze`
* `tls-scan`
* `Nessus` or `OpenVAS` (if applicable)
* `Wireshark` (optional, for in-depth validation)

***

**Test Execution Steps**

1. **Run Automated Vulnerability Scans**
   * Use scanning tools like `testssl.sh`, `SSLyze`, or `tls-scan` on the DUT’s exposed TLS service endpoints.
   * Focus specifically on:
     * Supported cipher suites (check for weak ciphers like RC4, 3DES)
     * Protocol versions (TLS 1.0, 1.1 should be flagged)
     * Vulnerabilities like:
       * Padding Oracle Attack (e.g., Lucky13)
       * POODLE, BEAST, FREAK
       * Insecure renegotiation
       * Insecure compression (e.g., CRIME)
2. **Analyze and Record Findings**
   * Document any vulnerabilities identified.
   * Map severity based on industry benchmarks (e.g., CVSS rating or tool-specific scoring).
   * Note configuration weaknesses, deprecated features, or absence of forward secrecy.
3. **Corroborate Using Multiple Tools**
   * Cross-validate results using at least two tools (e.g., testssl.sh and SSLyze) for accuracy.

***

**Expected Results for Pass**

* No **critical** or **high-severity** TLS vulnerabilities are present.
* TLS implementation does not use:
  * Deprecated protocol versions (SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1)
  * Weak cipher suites (e.g., RC4, 3DES, NULL, EXPORT)
* No signs of vulnerability to **known attacks** (e.g., padding oracle, downgrade attacks).
* Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is supported.

***

**Test Observations**

_(Insert summary — e.g., “TLS 1.2/1.3 detected. No weak ciphers or known attack vectors observed. DUT rejected insecure renegotiation.”)_

***

**Evidence Provided**

* Screenshots or logs of `testssl.sh`, `SSLyze`, etc.
* Tool reports highlighting absence of critical issues
* Screenshots showing DUT TLS negotiation/config responses (if applicable)

***

**Test Case Result**

☐ **Pass** – TLS implementation is free of critical vulnerabilities\
☐ **Fail** – One or more high-severity issues detected

***

Here is your **TEST 4 – BIS-2.2.4** rewritten in a clean, professional format suitable for audit and compliance reporting:

***

#### **TEST 4**

**Test Case ID:** BIS-2.2.4\
**Test Name:** TC\_TEST\_FIRMWARE\_DATA-IN-TRANSIT\_SECURITY\_NMAP

***

**Objective**

To identify open ports and associated services on the DUT using port scanning tools (e.g., Nmap), in order to evaluate potential exposure of services that could lead to unintended data access or leakage.

***

**Tools Used**

* **Nmap**\
  &#xNAN;_(Optional: Advanced options like `-sV`, `-Pn`, `-O`, or `--script` depending on the security policy)_

***

**Test Execution Steps**

1. **Port Scanning**
   * Execute a full TCP/UDP scan using Nmap against the DUT.
   * Recommended commands:
     * `nmap -sS -sV -p- <DUT_IP>` _(for full TCP scan with version detection)_
     * `nmap -sU -p- <DUT_IP>` _(for UDP services)_
2. **Service Enumeration**
   * Identify and document the services running on detected ports.
   * Compare the observed services with the list of expected/authorized services as per the device specification.
3. **Security Assessment**
   * Assess whether:
     * Any **unintended or unknown services** are exposed.
     * Services are using **secure protocols** (e.g., HTTPS vs HTTP).
     * Remote access services (e.g., Telnet, FTP) are **disabled** or **secured**.
4. **Reporting**
   * Highlight **any ports/services** that are:
     * Not documented in OEM config
     * Weak or unauthenticated
     * Redundant or unused in production deployment

***

**Expected Results for Pass**

* Nmap scan lists only **authorized and necessary** ports.
* All exposed services are verified to be:
  * **Secured by encryption or authentication**
  * **Justified as per OEM documentation**
* Unnecessary or insecure services are **not exposed**, or are **mitigated by ACLs/firewall**.

***

**Test Observations**

_(Example: “Ports 22 (SSH), 443 (HTTPS), and 8888 (Admin UI) detected. All services matched OEM declarations. No unauthorized or insecure services found.”)_

***

**Evidence Provided**

* Nmap output logs/screenshots
* Service enumeration results
* Device hardening checklist (if used)

***

**Test Case Result**

☐ **Pass** – Only secure and justified ports/services detected\
☐ **Fail** – One or more open ports expose unnecessary or vulnerable services

***

Here is your **TEST 5 – BIS-2.2.5** professionally structured and formatted for documentation, including the reported **FAIL** status:

***

#### **TEST 5**

**Test Case ID:** BIS-2.2.5\
**Test Name:** TC\_TEST\_FIRMWARE\_DATA-IN-TRANSIT\_SECURITY\_TLS

***

**Objective**

To verify whether the TLS session established by the DUT is secure and resistant to interception, decryption, or manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks.

***

**Tools Used**

* **Burp Suite (Professional/Community)**
* _(Optional: Ettercap, Wireshark for monitoring or validation)_

***

**Test Execution Steps**

1. **MITM Setup**
   * Configure Burp Suite as a proxy between the DUT and its server.
   * Redirect device traffic through Burp using techniques such as ARP spoofing or transparent proxy setup.
2. **Interception Attempt**
   * Attempt to intercept TLS traffic.
   * Observe if the DUT:
     * Accepts custom or self-signed certificates.
     * Proceeds with the TLS handshake when the certificate is invalid or untrusted.
3. **Decryption & Modification Attempt**
   * If interception is successful, try to decrypt and modify traffic content.
   * Monitor DUT behavior for anomalies or acceptance of altered traffic.

***

**Expected Results for Pass**

* The device **does not trust unverified/self-signed certificates**.
* The TLS session is **not established**, or **drops immediately** when MITM is attempted.
* No decrypted or altered data is accepted or processed by the DUT.

***

**Test Observations**

* The DUT accepted the Burp Suite-generated certificate without any error or verification failure.
* TLS handshake was successful despite the untrusted certificate, indicating lack of proper certificate validation.
* Encrypted traffic was decrypted in Burp Suite, exposing sensitive data in transit.

***

**Evidence Provided**

* Burp Suite TLS interception logs/screenshots
* Captured decrypted payloads
* DUT communication trace logs

***

**Test Case Result: ❌ FAIL**

***

**Overall Test Result for BIS-2.2.5 Module: ❌ FAIL**

_TLS implementation is vulnerable to MITM attacks due to lack of certificate validation._

***
