Test 1-2
TEST 1
Test Case ID: BIS-1.8.1 Test Name: TC_VERIFY_BOOT_IMAGE_SIGNATURE_VALID
Objective
To verify, in the presence of the OEM team, that the device successfully boots using the documented secure boot process when provided with a valid boot image containing a proper cryptographic signature. This test confirms that the secure boot mechanism correctly validates the boot image’s authenticity and integrity before execution.
Tools Used
OEM-provided datasheet and secure boot technical specifications
Valid vendor-signed boot image
Device console or serial access for monitoring boot process
Firmware signing verification tools (e.g., OpenSSL, vendor-specific signing utility)
Test Execution Steps
Documentation Review
Examine the SoC datasheet and device technical specifications for secure boot, including:
Key management lifecycle
Public/private key usage
Signature validation process
Preparation
With the OEM team present, obtain a valid boot image signed with the correct vendor private key.
Boot Process Execution
Load the valid boot image onto the DUT.
Power on or reset the DUT and monitor the boot sequence through the console/serial interface.
Signature Validation Confirmation
Confirm that the boot loader verifies the image signature against the correct embedded public key.
Ensure all cryptographic checks complete successfully without errors.
Expected Results for Pass
The DUT boots successfully using the valid signed boot image.
The secure boot process operates as documented, including correct public key verification and cryptographic signature checks.
Boot logs confirm successful validation of the image signature.
Test Observations
(Insert findings here — e.g., "Boot completed successfully with vendor-signed image; boot log confirmed RSA signature validation and secure boot completion.")
Evidence Provided
Boot log excerpts showing signature verification success
Screenshot of firmware signing command and result
OEM confirmation of secure boot process adherence
Test Case Result
☐ Pass – Device booted successfully and verified valid signed image ☐ Fail – Secure boot process failed or did not validate signature as expected
TEST 2
Test Case ID: BIS-1.8.2 Test Name: TC_VERIFY_BOOT_IMAGE_SIGNATURE_INVALID
Objective
To verify, in the presence of the OEM team, that the device fails to boot when provided with a tampered or invalid boot image (e.g., altered signature, missing signature), thereby confirming the secure boot process prevents unauthorized software execution.
Tools Used
OEM-provided firmware image (for tampering)
Hex editor or binary modification tools to alter/remove the signature
Device console or serial access for monitoring boot output
OEM-provided documentation of secure boot signature validation process
Test Execution Steps
Tampered Image Preparation
In collaboration with the OEM team, create a boot image with one of the following modifications:
Altered signature (bit modification in signed portion)
Removed signature field entirely
Boot Attempt
Load the tampered boot image onto the DUT.
Power on or reset the device while monitoring output via console or serial connection.
Behavior Observation
Document any error messages, warnings, or halted boot sequences indicating signature verification failure.
Expected Results for Pass
The DUT fails to boot with the tampered or invalid boot image.
Boot logs or console output clearly indicate signature verification failure or image rejection.
Secure boot mechanism prevents execution of the tampered image, confirming protection against unauthorized software.
Test Observations
(Insert findings here — e.g., "Boot halted at signature verification stage; console output: 'ERROR – Boot image signature invalid; secure boot failed.'")
Evidence Provided
Boot log excerpts showing signature validation failure
Screenshot of tampered image generation/modification process
OEM-signed confirmation of test execution and results
Test Case Result
☐ Pass – Tampered image rejected and boot process halted ☐ Fail – Device booted or did not correctly validate the image
Overall Test Result
(Summarize outcome of BIS-1.8.1 and BIS-1.8.2 — e.g., "Secure boot mechanism successfully validated signed image and rejected tampered image; requirement met.")
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